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Can the United States Export Democracy?
Mary Fran T. Malone
Department of Political Science

T

oday we hear politicians, pundits, and the
public grapple with this question, particularly
as the United States struggles to guide democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq. This question is
far from new, however, as democracy promotion has
featured prominently in U.S. rhetoric for some time. In
some cases, the U.S. encouraged democratization with
carrots, dangling financial incentives in the faces of
countries contemplating free and fair elections.
In others, the U.S. used a stick, sending the electoral
ballots in with the marines. Have these efforts worked?
Can the U.S. export democracy with carrots, sticks, or
some combination of the two? A historical review of the
empirical evidence provides some fascinating answers
to these questions. Based upon this evidence, this paper
argues that the method of exporting democracy is not
nearly as important as commitment: be it through the
carrot or the stick, to export democracy successfully the
United States must fully fund and staff its democratization efforts.

Promoting Democracy: A Historical
Overview

Democracy promotion first featured prominently in
U.S. foreign policy rhetoric in the aftermath of the 1898
Spanish American War. Defeat of the Spanish propelled
the U.S. to superpower status, and as a superpower,
the U.S. sought to increase its influence in the western hemisphere. From 1898–1933, the marines were
dispatched approximately 30 times to Latin American
countries and occupied some nations as long as 34
years. Frequently, the U.S. cloaked its interventions
under the guise of democracy promotion. U.S. leaders
argued that such active intervention was necessary in
order to promote democracy throughout the region.
However, critics noted that the countries with the most
U.S. intervention (e.g., El Salvador, Guatemala, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua) also had repressive authoritarian governments. Furthermore, critics
pointed out that patterns of U.S. intervention were not
conducive to democratization, but they did succeed in

promoting U.S. economic interests. Indeed, President
Teddy Roosevelt’s foreign policy was known as “Dollar
Diplomacy” due to its heavy focus on the protection of
U.S. economic interests.
As early as 1928, U.S. officials themselves began
to criticize democracy promotion tactics. President
Hoover argued, “True democracy is not and cannot be
imperialistic,” and he pledged to reverse the policy of
democratization by invasion. Five years later President
Franklin Roosevelt went even further and launched his
“Good Neighbor Policy.” Under the Good Neighbor
Policy, the U.S. would withdraw all of its troops from
Latin America, refrain from future intervention, and
emphasize diplomatic consultations and negotiations.
The U.S. adhered to this policy until World War II, and
while the Good Neighbor Policy promoted trade and
U.S. investment, it still did not improve democratization of the region any better than its predecessor.
The Good Neighbor Policy was interrupted by World
War II. In the aftermath of this war, the U.S. renewed its
commitment to democratization, this time on a much
larger global scale. Even the strongest critics of U.S. foreign policy tend to agree that at least in the cases of Germany and Japan, the rhetoric matched the action. The
U.S. was genuinely interested in reconstructing Germany and Japan and transforming them into democracies
(with capitalist economies). In Japan, democratization
was choreographed by approximately 5,500 occupation
officials, backed by the power of 150,000 troops. With
complete control over Japanese territory, occupation officials moved quickly to dismantle military and police
institutions, overhaul legal and educational systems,
and author a new constitution. Democratization in Germany followed a similar pattern. Once again, foreign
troops fully occupied German territory and became the
de facto government for four years. Differences among
the victorious Allies led to a division of Germany;
however, France, Great Britain, and the U.S. were all
committed to establishing a strong democratic state.
Meticulous care was taken to design democratic institutions that would rectify the flaws that led to the collapse
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of democracy and the rise of fascism in the 1930s. The
resulting German system had numerous provisions that
staunchly upheld human rights and government stability, while thwarting attempts of one political party to
monopolize control of the country. By the end of the
1950s, democratization in Germany and Japan was considered an overwhelming success.
While the U.S. was strongly committed to democratization of Germany and Japan, it would be incorrect to characterize U.S. foreign policy as centered on
democracy promotion during the Cold War. Just as
democracy was taking root in Germany and Japan, the
U.S. pursued a very different strategy in places like Guatemala. In 1954, the U.S. helped to overthrow the leader
of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz. Elected democratically
in 1950, Arbenz aimed to transform Guatemala’s feudal
economy into a modern capitalist state. He pledged that
this transformation would benefit all Guatemalans, targeting in particular the rural poor, of which 70% were
illiterate and only 18% had access to potable water. Unfortunately for Arbenz, the U.S. found two major flaws
in his plan for economic transformation. First, his economic plan included the appropriation of unused land
owned by the United Fruit Company—a company with
strong ties to the Eisenhower administration that did
not like the compensation package offered by the Guatemalan government. Second, while Arbenz was not a
communist himself, there were communist sympathizers in his government. The U.S. deemed Arbenz too soft
on communism as well as too quick to seize the land
of an American company. The C.I.A. began to train a
group of disenchanted Guatemalan military officers to
overthrow the government, and in 1954, they helped
launch a successful military coup against Arbenz. The
overthrow of Arbenz plunged the country into four decades of civil war; not until 1996 would Guatemala find
itself at peace, ready to start the process of democratization again.
Another prominent case of the U.S. reversing democratization occurred in Chile, which up until 1973
enjoyed a long democratic tradition. Chileans democratically elected President Salvador Allende with a
razor thin plurality of the vote in 1970. Allende was a
self-proclaimed Marxist who pledged to find a “Third
Way” for Chilean economic development by incorporating some elements of socialism into Chilean democracy.
Allende aimed to fund his poverty-reducing initiatives
by expanding state ownership of key economic areas—
particularly the copper industry. American companies
were heavily vested in the Chilean copper industry, and
American investment in Chile was estimated at $1 bil-

lion. The Nixon administration labeled Allende
a threat and aimed to overthrow him. In 1973, the U.S.
supported Augusto Pinochet’s military attack that led to
the death of Allende as well as Chile’s long democratic
tradition. Pinochet ruled Chile with an iron fist until
the end of the Cold War.
U.S. policy throughout the Cold War is marked by
examples of democracy promotion as well as democracy
reversal. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War,
the U.S. began to take the task of democracy promotion more seriously, assisting democratization in the
developing world in myriad ways. In some cases, the
U.S. used financial incentives, or carrots, encouraging authoritarian regimes to democratize by providing
technical assistance, loans, and grants. If such regimes
proved hesitant to start democratic transformations, the
U.S. would take these carrots away, leaving developing
countries without access to the economic assistance
they desperately needed. On the other hand, the U.S.
has demonstrated that it is not averse to using a stick either. In Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the U.S.
democratized from the barrel of a gun, invading countries and leaving democratic institutions in its wake.

Assessing the Success of Carrots and Sticks

When one examines the track record of U.S. democracy
promotion after the Cold War, the results are mixed.
In some cases, the carrots have worked extraordinarily
well, as nations have begun to adopt democratic institutions and procedures in response to U.S. financial
incentives. Such was the case in Chile, where in a dramatic turnaround the U.S. pressured Pinochet to step
down and provided financial support to pro-democracy
groups challenging his reign. These financial incentives
worked extraordinarily well, leading to the downfall of
Pinochet and the renewal of a strong and vibrant democratic government. In South Africa, the racist regime of
apartheid crumbled in the face of U.S. and international
economic sanctions and boycotts. The U.S. banded
together with the rest of the global community to support democracy activist Nelson Mandela as he emerged
from decades of imprisonment to become the first black
South African president. With international assistance
and against all odds, Mandela led his country from the
brink of civil war to establish the first multiracial, democratic government in South African history.
In other cases, however, the carrots have languished.
For example, while Guatemala received substantial
amounts of U.S. aid, democracy has proven to be quite
hollow, as former coup plotters and human rights abusers have undermined the constitution in order to run
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for office. Guatemalans tend to evaluate democratic
progress in their country in negative terms; in some
cases, up to 30% of the population believes that democracy does not really exist in the country. Venezuela also
received substantial sums of U.S. and international assistance throughout the 1990s, particularly to reform
its judicial branch. This assistance did not succeed in
halting the demise of the party system in the country,
or in preventing the rise of a former coup plotter, Hugo
Chavez, to the presidency. In yet another twist, from the
U.S. perspective democracy worked perhaps too well
in Nicaragua, where last year Nicaraguans democratically elected longtime U.S. nemesis Daniel Ortega to
the presidency. Still, while financial incentives are not
always sufficient to establish democracy, on average the
track record is positive. A recent cross-national study
of U.S. foreign assistance on democracy building found
that while there are exceptions (and these exceptions
should not be overlooked), countries that have received
U.S. financial assistance to promote democracy have
succeeded in doing so. That is, recipients of U.S. aid on
average tend to be more democratic than non-recipients.
Democracy with a stick has a more checkered past in
the post-Cold War era. Invasion was eventually successful in promoting democracy in Panama, yet has become
mired in insurgency in Iraq. In Panama, the U.S. was
guided by the Powell Doctrine, which stated that if the
U.S. were to invade, it must do so with overwhelming
force. To invade a country of approximately 2.5 million, the U.S. relied upon 26,000 troops. While the U.S.
quickly ousted dictator Manuel Noriega and secured
control of Panamanian territory, democratization was
a long and tenuous process. The U.S. invaded Panama
at the end of 1989, ostensibly to arrest Noriega for drug
trafficking, yet realistically democracy did not take root
until 1994, when the economy began to recover and
newly elected President Balladares began to overhaul
and democratize Panamanian institutions.
In contrast to the successful (albeit slow) democratization of Panama, subsequent attempts at democratization by invasion have proven less successful. Today
Iraq and Afghanistan feature most prominently in the
media; however, in 1994 the U.S. encountered similar
problems on a much smaller scale in Haiti. To address
massive human rights abuses occurring in Haiti and
stem the tide of refuges headed towards the U.S., President Clinton authorized an invasion to remove the dictator Raoul Cédras from power and establish a democratic regime. Six hours after launching the invasion,
the dictatorship agreed to step down, opening the path
for democracy. Skipping the invasion, the U.S. moved to

the occupation phase, using more than 20,000 troops to
control Haiti and assume temporary control of the government. While a large force was initially sent to occupy
Haiti, by 1995 this force was replaced by 6,000 U.N.
peacekeepers. By 1996, this mission had dwindled to
600. As U.S. and international commitment waned, so
did prospects for democracy. Political instability, lackluster economic performance, and social unrest spiraled
out of control, engulfing the nation in violence and
chaos. Today prospects for democracy in Haiti remain
dim, as pro-democracy leaders have not succeeded in
maintaining control over the country.
These contrasts between Panama and Haiti raise several interesting questions concerning U.S. strategies for
democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan today.
What can we learn from past experiences with democracy promotion to inform U.S. strategies today? First,
it appears that success is possible with both carrots and
sticks, yet so is failure. When distinguishing between
the successful and unsuccessful cases, it appears that
the deciding factor is commitment. Democratization
is a long process that requires sustained commitment
in terms of monetary and personnel resources. Second,
democratization rarely proceeds in a linear fashion.
Rather, it advances in spurts and occasional setbacks.
Initial successes can easily be reversed, which is why
it is essential to sustain close ties with democratizing
countries to provide the needed assistance—not leave
prematurely as soon as things start to improve. Finally,
it is important to remember that the rest of the global
community might be suspicious of U.S. motives for
promoting democracy. While the U.S. most certainly
was dedicated to promoting democracy in places like
Japan and Germany, in cases like Chile, the record is a
bit uneven, as the U.S. was willing to promote as well as
reverse democratization. A familiarity with past efforts
of democracy promotion can help the U.S. formulate
successful foreign policy and understand global perceptions of U.S. efforts.
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